Public attitudes toward markets and toward democracy are fundamental to the well-functioning of an economy and a society. Attitudes toward markets and attitudes toward democracy are naturally connected: both are about individual freedoms, how they should be allowed, how the freedoms can be assured, or, on the other hand, how they should be limited.
In 1990, a year before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, while one of us, Boycko, lived in Moscow, and while the other, Shiller, lived in New Haven, in the greater New York area, we did a telephone survey of the general public in the respective cities (with Ukrainian survey expert Vladimir Korobov) about attitudes toward markets. Questions were about fair prices and income inequality, resistance to exchange of money, lack of appreciation for incentives, and hostility toward business, (see Shiller et al (1991) ). The questions, as well as questions in our follow-up survey Shiller et al (1992) , were identical as far as the translation between Russian and English would allow, and as far as our impressions of how the questions would be understood could be.
We designed questions that would reveal the underpinnings of attitudinal differences between the countries, based on our personal impressions in our respective countries of the significant underlying differences. Our questions avoided direct use of abstract concepts, like "markets" or "capitalism", as we were concerned that these may have subtly different meanings in the two countries, colored by culture, associations, prevailing senses of politically correct usage, etc.
Instead we asked respondents about their behavior in, or evaluations of, imaginary scenarios that resemble real life situations that the respondents in both countries were likely familiar with.
In the same year, 1990, political scientists James Gibson, Raymond Duch and Kent Tedin, (1992) did a telephone survey in Moscow with questions about attitudes toward democracy. We felt their survey contained some of the same spirit as ours and similar methodology. Although Gibson et al (1992) did not provide an explicit comparison with US or another developed democracy, they largely avoided asking directly about "democracy", "competition among political parties", or "strong leader".
1 Instead, their respondents were mostly asked to evaluate social rules applied to specific situations or scenarios. The questions probed attitudes to social norms, freedoms, rights consciousness, tolerance of minority views, support for dissent, etc.
1 A good example of this more direct approach to measuring Russian political attitudes is Hale (2011) . See Guriev et al 2008 and Treisman (2011, pp 377-388) for recent surveys of this literature.
In this paper, we report on a new survey that we have done in 2015, twenty-five years after these 1990 surveys. The script for the interviewer had as its first part the identical questions that we asked in 1990 (then called Questionnaire B), and in the identical order, followed by seven of the questions asked by Gibson et al, though not an exact ordered sequence of their question scripts.
Since the Gibson et al. survey in 1990 was in Russian only, we did a retranslation of their original Russian questions into English, making slight improvements in the accuracy of the translation over the English translation of the questions that were presented in the Gibson et al. (1992) paper.
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Knowing that answers to questionnaires are influenced by framing, and by the previous questions asked, we wanted to make the procedure identical through time as much as possible, which is something we could do for the first part of the interviews. The details of the 1990 surveys are in Shiller et al. (1991) and Gibson et al. (1992 Table A1 below.
I. Changes in Russia and in the United States over 25 Years
Since 1990, Russia has experienced tectonic changes in its economic and political system, largely succeeding in building a market economy, but failing to develop a functioning democracy. While illiberal and non-democratic attitudes are certainly common in Russia, the question is how frequent they are compared to the same attitudes in developed democracies. Gibson et al (1992) showed that these frequencies were in fact low in 1990, generally comparable to those observed in developed countries with functioning democracies. An important objective of our 2015 surveys was to explore if the frequencies of non-democratic attitudes are still low in Russia and to compare them directly to United States.
Another recent development in Russia is massive and, admittedly, effective government propaganda effort 4 , which has a substantial anti-Western component. "Western democracy" is generally portrayed as dysfunctional, amoral, hypocritical, etc., which has likely damaged public perception of the concept of democracy, and might have affected the fundamental attitudes to it as well. We believe that in the current, "propaganda-intensive" environment, responses to the questions in our survey, mostly focused on social rules applied to specific situations, have a better chance of revealing fundamental public attitudes than the more direct questions about democracy.
In the United States, economic and political changes since 1990 appear less dramatic. In 1990
Ronald Reagan's free market revolution was still new, but already suffering from concerns that deregulation had spawned a savings and loan crisis. By 2015, doubts about free markets were reinforced by the 2008 financial crisis. Doubts can be observed through social movements such as the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011, the surge of concern with inequality as with Piketty (2014), the expressions of fears of dangers to working people from robotics destroying economic power of working people, and the enthusiastic reception to socialist Bernie Sanders of 2015.
Changes in the two countries over the 25 year period presented certain challenges for our survey methodology and data analysis. The proliferation of mobile phones in both countries required us to get representative samples of the users of the two kinds of telephones. Large shifts in the composition of the underlying populations of Moscow and New York necessitated additional attention to control variables. However, probit regressions with controls for age, sex, education level, foreign origin, rural origin, and cell phone confirmed statistical significance of "large" differences between countries or over time with only a few exceptions.
When presenting our results below we report the frequencies of "anti-market" and "antidemocracy" responses. In calculating these frequencies we omit "No answer" responses from the denominator. Same-year differences between the two countries that in our probit regressions are statistically significant at 5% and at 1% are marked by " C " and " CC ", respectively; statistically significant differences within a country over time (between 1990 and 2015) are marked by " T " (at 5%) and "
TT " (at 1%).
II. Attitudes toward Free Markets
Our original conclusion from the 1990 survey was that attitudes toward markets were surprisingly similar between Russia and the United States. We find they are generally as similar in 2015, maybe even more so.
For example, in our 1990 survey we asked a question that referred to demand-induced increases Still, at around 50%, the level of concern about confiscation of savings remains substantial in both countries, actually.
Another unexpected result of the 1990 study was Russians' relative willingness to make large risky investments in a business of a group of friends. Perhaps due to negative experience or improved investment opportunities this willingness has declined and there are no intercountry differences here anymore: In responses to another work-related question, we document a moderate "anti-market" shift in Russians' views of whether it is appropriate to take initiative at work: As a general summary of these results, while there are differences, we see a basic similarity across countries and through time. Sometimes Russians have a dimmer view of free market outcomes and incentives, sometimes the Americans.
III. Attitudes toward Democracy
In Table 1 below we present frequencies of "anti-democratic" responses to seven questions about democracy from Gibson et al (1992) in the three subsamples. The "anti-democratic" responses are "agree" or "completely agree" in questions B13, B14, B15, and B18, but "disagree" or "completely disagree" in B16, B17, and B19 (we reordered and renumbered Gibson's questions)
In responses to three out of the seven questions (B13, B14, B15) we document an increase in anti-democratic attitudes in Moscow between 1990 and 2015 8 and these same attitudes are the only ones that appear substantially stronger in Moscow than in New York in 2015.
We observe a regrettable increase in Russians' intolerance of minority views, as evidenced in responses to B13. But, at 37%, the frequency of this intolerance remains below 50% and not too far from that of Americans (29%).
In 1990, most Russians used to support the freedom of demonstrations by radical and extremist groups that may lead to disorder and destruction (question B14), in 2015 they no longer do. But in 2015 Russians may overreact to the words "radical" and "extremist" that are heavily employed by government propaganda, with its emphasis on discrediting "color revolutions" in neighboring countries. Nevertheless, the difference with Americans is large, at 31 percentage points.
Still, the largest difference with Americans that we found, of 41 percentage points in responses to question B15, relates to a preference for a society with strict order at the expense of some freedoms that may bring "destruction to the society". This preference, at 76% in Moscow today, is not too different from 69%, recorded by Gibson et al (1992) 25 years ago.
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The other differences between Russians and Americans in attitudes toward democracy, as evidenced in responses to questions B16-B19 in Table 1 , appear fairly small and unimportant, or go in the other direction.
Is the glass of Russians' attitudes to democracy half-full or half-empty? While in several respects "pro-democracy" attitudes are not as strong in Russia today as 25 years ago and weaker than those of contemporary Americans, we find strong correlation between our survey results and those of Gibson et al (1992) who "… discovered far more support for democratic values in Moscow than
[they] anticipated" (p. 360).
IV. Interpretation of Results
Back in 1990, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the launch of President Yeltsin's market reforms, a common view in Russia was that ordinary Russians are "not ready" for the transition to a market economy, because they do not understand the markets and have different values. The impact of Shiller et. al. (1991) , despite its finding of some interesting attitudinal differences between Russians and Americans, was to demonstrate that this view was really not supported by evidence. Today, after 25 years of development of markets in Russia, that old view sounds almost ridiculous. The new evidence presented in this paper, building on the earlier results of Gibson et al (1992) , again uncovers some differences between Russians and Americans in their attitudes toward democracy. Yet on balance the evidence does not support a parallel common view that the Russian personality is fundamentally illiberal or non-democratic. Perhaps at some point in the future this view will sound ridiculous, too. Note: The nature of "anti-democratic" response is shown in square brackets. Questions are from Gibson et al. (1992) 
